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BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD
W
hen the Supreme 
Court accepted the 
petition by the US 
so l i c i t o r  g enera l 
that it take up Edie 
Windsor’s lawsuit against the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), it posed 
two questions that could derail any 
quick resolution about the 1996 law’s 
constitutionality.
First, the solicitor general must 
address whether the federal govern-
ment’s “agreement” with the Second 
Circuit ruling that DOMA is unconsti-
tutional deprives the Supreme Court 
of “jurisdiction to decide this case.” 
The high court also asked whether the 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the 
US House of Representatives (BLAG) — 
which includes the three most senior 
Republicans and the top two Democrats, 
split along party lines in their view of the 
case, and intervened at the trial court to 
defend DOMA when the Obama admin-
istration declined to do so — has legal 
standing to participate in the case. 
Since the court assumed neither Wind-
sor, the government, nor BLAG would 
argue to the high court that it lacks juris-
diction, the justices appointed Harvard 
Law School Professor Vicki Jackson as a 
“friend of the Court” to make that argu-
ment. Her brief, written with attorneys 
from Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld 
LLP, was filed on January 24.
Though complex, the jurisdictional 
questions raise a serious possibility the 
court will not actually decide whether 
DOMA is unconstitutional in the Wind-
sor case.
The Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Constitution’s provision that “judicial 
power” extends to “cases” and “contro-
versies” as a limitation on the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts — they are barred 
from issuing “advisory opinions,” but 
instead can only rule on issues disputed 
between parties who have something 
personally at stake.
Windsor, a widow who lives in New 
York, had to pay $363,053 in federal 
estate taxes that would not have been 
owed had the government recognized her 
Canadian same-sex marriage to Thea 
Spyer, who died in 2009. She clearly has 
a stake in this lawsuit, so it presented 
a real “controversy” to the US District 
Court for the Southern District of New 
York in Manhattan.
BLAG argues that since New York 
State did not adopt a marriage equal-
ity law until 2011, Windsor’s marriage 
would not have been recognized by 
the state had a case gone to its highest 
bench. Without state recognition, BLAG 
asserts, Windsor cannot argue the feder-
al government must recognize her mar-
riage. Lower courts, however, conclud-
ed otherwise, pointing to intermediate 
appellate courts in New York and state 
officials who agreed such a marriage 
would be recognized even absent a gay 
marriage law.
BLAG continues to hold to its argu-
ment that Windsor has no valid claim, 
though the assertion is made only in 
a footnote in its January 22 brief to the 
Supreme Court.
The real jurisdictional issue facing the 
high court relates to the roles the govern-
ment and BLAG have played in the case. 
Prior to Windsor’s lawsuit going to court, 
President Barack Obama and Attorney 
General Eric Holder reconsidered their 
position on whether the ban on federal rec-
ognition of same-sex marriages in DOMA’s 
Section 3 was constitutional. When they 
concluded it was not, Holder 
informed Republican House 
Speaker John Boehner the 
administration would not 
defend DOMA in court, at 
which time BLAG intervened, 
while the Senate, under Dem-
ocratic control, expressed no 
interest in doing so. 
Paul Clement, solicitor gen-
eral under President George 
W. Bush who represents 
BLAG as outside counsel, 
opposed Windsor’s motion for 
summary judgment, the Jus-
tice Department argued in favor of it, and 
the district court granted it.
Despite the administration’s support 
for Windsor’s suit, the Justice Depart-
ment, having doubts about BLAG’s 
standing to appeal, filed an appeal of 
its own to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals to ensure the issue would con-
tinue making its way through the courts. 
Though the Justice Department argued 
before the Second Circuit that it should 
affirm Windsor’s district court victory, 
even before the appeals court ruled, both 
the solicitor general and Windsor filed 
petitions asking the Supreme Court to 
review the case. Even though the dis-
trict court had ruled in their favor, they 
argued the DOMA question needed a 
definitive answer from the highest court.
After the Second Circuit affirmed 
the district court, the solicitor general 
filed an additional statement with the 
Supreme Court, arguing that this case, 
rather a ruling from the First Circuit that 
had earlier struck down DOMA’s Section 
3, would make the best vehicle for ruling 
on its constitutionality. On December 7, 
the high court granted the solicitor gen-
eral’s petition — but not Windsor’s — 
adding the questions about jurisdiction.
Professor Jackson’s brief argues the 
solicitor general’s petition does not present 
the court with a real “controversy” because 
the government does not disagree with the 
rulings from the Second Circuit and the 
district court. In effect, the government is 
simply asking the Supreme Court to affirm 
the lower court rulings. 
If there is an adversary party, there is 
a real controversy to decide, and that’s 
where BLAG comes in. But does it have 
standing to argue for reversal of the Sec-
ond Circuit decision? 
A party has standing if they have a 
personal stake in the outcome of the 
matter that is distinct from the general 
interest any citizen has in the correct 
interpretation of the law. Windsor has a 
$363,053 stake in the matter, since she 
had to fork over the money. The govern-
ment always has a stake in the question 
of whether a statute is constitutional, 
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ment, citing gay historians to the effect 
that most overt discrimination dates 
back to the early 20th century, since the 
concept of homosexuality itself emerged 
only in the mid-19th century. Clem-
ent’s assertion conveniently overlooks 
the capital punishment that traditional 
English law prescribed for “sodomites,” 
whether or not they were called homo-
sexuals.
Like Cooper in his Prop 8 brief, Clem-
ent adopts the view that the govern-
ment’s “legitimate” interest in distin-
guishing between same-sex and differ-
ent-sex couples is based on the need to 
channel heterosexual procreation. 
What is striking about both the Prop 8 
and DOMA briefs is what is missing. Nei-
ther goes in for gay-bashing, asserts that 
prohibitions on same-sex marriage can 
be justified by moral disapproval, or con-
tends that gay couples are inadequate as 
parents. Both briefs are carefully writ-
ten to project a matter-of-fact tone about 
rational decision-making. 
What they also leave out is any refer-
ence to love and affection having anything 
to do with marriage. Both briefs essen-
tially argue that marriage is about chil-
dren, not about the spouses, and that the 
great “danger” of “redefining” marriage 
to be “genderless” is in putting the prime 
focus on the marital partners instead of 
the family. Neither brief acknowledges 
the substantial percentage of same-sex 
couples raising children and the ways 
in which their exclusion from a marital 
home may be harmful to them. Instead, 
Cooper and Clement harp on studies 
showing the disadvantages suffered by 
children raised by single mothers whose 
fathers have abandoned them. 
Both briefs, for the most part, ignore 
the huge structure of legal rights and 
responsibilities attached to modern 
marriage in America, paring the insti-
tution down to its rudimentary essen-
tials in the pre-modern state. In other 
words, they are appealing to the “origi-
nalists” on the high court, as Cooper 
makes clear when he expresses incre-
dulity that anyone would contend that 
the generation that enacted the 14th 
Amendment in 1868 intended to confer 
the right to marry on gay and lesbian 
couples. Those on the high court who 
regard the 14th Amendment as estab-
lishing general concepts of fairness and 
equality rather than a specific image 
based on mid-19th century life will, one 
hopes, reject this view. 
There is a reasonable prospect that 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, the swing 
vote on the court, may be among that 
group. In the conclusion of his opinion 
in the 2003 Lawrence v. Texas sodomy 
case, he wrote, “Had those who drew 
and ratified the Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth Amendment [1791] or the 
Fourteenth Amendment [1868] known 
the components of liberty in its manifold 
possibilities, they might have been more 
specific. They did not presume to have 
this insight. They knew that times can 
blind us to certain truths and later gen-
erations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only 
to oppress. As the Constitution endures, 
persons in every generation can invoke 
its principles in their own search for 
greater freedom.”
A month from now, those challenging 
Prop 8 and DOMA will file their briefs, 
and Cooper and Clement will receive 
their responses. The cases will be argued 
on March 26 and 27.
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The brief argues the 
solicitor general’s petition 
doesn’t present a real 
“controversy”  because the 
government doesn’t disagree with 
rulings from the Second Circuit and 
the district court. 
